By Solovay's celebrated completeness result [31] on formal provability we know that the provability logic GL describes exactly all provable structural properties for any sound and strong enough arithmetical theory with a decidable axiomatisation. Japaridze generalised this result in [22] by considering a polymodal version GLP of GL with modalities [n] for each natural number n referring to ever increasing notions of provability.
0
n formulas as oracles". In this paper we generalise this interpretation into the transfinite. In order to do so, a main difficulty to overcome is to generalise the syntactical characterisations of the oracle formulas of complexity Π 0 n to the hyper-arithmetical hierarchy. The paper exploits the fact that provability is Σ 0 1 complete and that similar results hold for stronger provability notions. As such, the oracle sentences to define provability at level α will recursively be taken to be consistency statements at lower levels: provability through provability whence the name of the paper.
The paper proves soundness and completeness for the proposed interpretation for a wide class of theories; namely for any theory that can formalise the recursion described above and that has some further very natural properties. Some remarks are provided on how the recursion can be formalised into second order arithmetic and on lowering the prooftheoretical strength of these systems of second order arithmetic.
Introduction
As mentioned in the abstract, by Solovay's celebrated completeness result [31] on provability we know that the provability logic GL describes exactly all provable structural properties for any sound and strong enough arithmetical theory with a decidable axiomatisation. Japaridze generalised this result in [22] by considering a polymodal version GLP of GL with modalities [n] for each natural number n referring to ever increasing notions of provability.
Japaridze considered an arithmetical interpretation of the logic GLP where the [n] referred to a natural formalisation of "provable over the base theory T using at most n nested applications of the ω-rule". Beklemishev introduced in [6] the logics GLP Λ that are like GLP only that they now include a sequence of provability predicates [α] of ever increasing strength for each ordinal α below some fixed ordinal Λ. In [17] the authors generalised Japaridze's result into the transfinite by providing an interpretation of GLP Λ for recursive Λ into second order arithmetic by allowing for [α] at most α nestings of the omega rule, thereby providing a first arithmetical interpretation of GLP Λ for Λ > ω. In a recent paper ( [9] ) Beklemishev and Pakhomov provide an alternative interpretation in first order arithmetic enriched with a collection of ever more expressive truth predicates indexed by the ordinals.
Modern treatments of GLP ω tend to interpret the [n] provability notion as "provable in a base theory T together with all true Π 0 n formulas". Let us call this the truth-interpretation here. The main reason for the popularity of the truth-interpretation is that the resulting provability hierarchies run in phase with the arithmetical hierarchy and they imply good preservation properties between different consistency statements giving rise to the so-called reduction property. In particular, due to these good properties Beklemishev was able to set GLP ω to work to perform proof-theoretical analyses of Peano Arithmetic and its kin ( [3, 4, 5] ). Below we shall give more circumstantial evidence to why the truth interpretation is optimal.
As mentioned, the first arithmetical interpretation of transfinite polymodal provability logic ( [17] ) was, like Japaridze's original approach, based on iterating applications of the omega rule. Although it was observed in [23] that soundness of the interpretation is sufficient for the purpose of an ordinal analysis, the paper also contained a completeness proof in such general lines that it can be applied to a wide range of interpretations.
It seemed however, that the omega-rule interpretation does not have all the desirable properties to make it directly a useful tool for ordinal analyses. Even though various known fragments of second order arithmetic like ATR 0 , Π 1 1 − CA 0 and Π 1 1 − CA 0 + Bar Induction can be characterised ( [10, 13] ) in terms of reflection principles using versions of the omega rule interpretation of GLP Λ , the fine-structure between various consistency statements could not be proven.
One possible reason may be that the omega provability predicates do not tie up with the arithmetical hierarchy and Turing jumps as observed in [24, Lemma 9] . A more concrete and serious objection is given in an unpublished simple observation from Fernández Duque: using only one application of the omegarule one can prove any induction axiom so that the one-consistency of primitive recursive arithmetic in the omega-rule sense suffices to prove the consistency of Peano arithmetic.
In short, the truth interpretation of GLP ω has better properties than the omega-rule interpretation. However, one advantage of the omega-rule interpretation is its amenability to transfinite generalisations. The formalisation of the truth interpretation relies on a syntactical characterisation of the arithmetical hierarchy in terms of the Σ 0 n formulas. It remained unclear how to generalise this in a canonical way to the hyperarithmetical setting or beyond without extending the language in a way that often seems rather ad-hoc.
The idea of this paper to overcome this is very simple yet turns out to be rather powerful. The Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington theorem (FGH) tells us that for a wide range of theories, in a sense, the canonical consistency predicate is Π 0 1 complete. Thus, instead of using a true Π 0 1 sentence as oracle for the [1] T provability predicate in the truth interpretation, one can use a provably equivalent consistency statement.
Via a generalisation of the FGH theorem proven in [24, 26] one can see that the consistency notion corresponding to [1] provability is in a sense Π 0 2 complete and so on. Thus, it makes sense to consider the following recursion as in [24] : provability at level n means provable from an oracle which is a consistency statement of level m for some m < n. It feels like lifting oneself up from the swamp by pulling ones hairs as the Baron von Münchhausen did. Moreover, the recursion lends itself to an easy transfinite generalisation and that is exactly what this paper does. Before we close the introduction with an overview of how the current paper does so, we would like to point out how this paper fits in the landscape of related literature thereby trying to provide an ample justification for it.
Ordinal analysis via polymodal provability logics seems to have various benefits over other methods of ordinal analysis. An important benefit is it allows to tell different incomplete theories apart at the lowest possible level of Π 0 1 sentences. It is good to recall that the classical Π 1 1 proof theoretical ordinal will not even discern theories at the level of Σ 1 1 -level. Another benefit may seem the modularity of ordinal analysis: the ordinal analysis of different theories will all share the same template and re-use various tools and theorems.
We see another stronghold in the fact that the approach relates various different fields in a natural way. In particular, the closed formulas of GLPcalled worms-are important in this. Worms can be used to denote various notions central to foundational issues. For one, they are simple and well-behaved elements from a well-behaved logic. Even though the logic GLP is known to be PSPACE-complete ( [29] ) it is Kripke incomplete. However, natural topological semantics do exist ( [20, 21, 8, 12, 1] ) even though it is known to depend on strong cardinal assumptions for various natural topological spaces [2] .
Moreover, the closed fragment of GLP Λ is very well behaved, well studied and in particular does allow for natural relational semantics [21, 14, 15] . In addition, and this provides a second interpretation of worms, the worms are known to define a well-ordered relation as studied in [6, 7, 16] and thus can provide for ordinal notation systems ( [6, 18, 11] ).
Some simple worms are just consistency statements which are known to be related to reflection principles so that by classical results they are related to fragments of arithmetic [27] . Thus, worms -apart from being privileged elements of a decidable logic-can denote both ordinals and fragments of arithmetic. A possibly more important use however lies in their relation to Turing progressions: each Turing progression below ε 0 can be approximated by the arithmetical in-terpretation of a GLP ω worm. The relation goes even that far so that points in a universal modal model for the closed fragment of GLP ω can be seen as arithmetical theories axiomatised by Turing progressions ( [25] ) so that the model displays all conservation results between the different theories. It is these four different possible denotations for worms that make them so versatile and make new interpretations of GLP Λ as the current paper so promising.
Plan of the paper Section 2 provides some useful lemmata and settles on notation which otherwise is quite standard so that it can be skipped by the initiate readers only to come back to it when needed. Then, in Section 3 the central provability notion of this paper is introduced: one-Münchhausen provability. The usage of the word "one" in there refers to the fact that provability at level α is allowed to use a single oracle sentence of a lower level consistency statement.
Section 4 mainly dwells on the fact that in general we can not prove that different Münchhausen provability predicates are provably equivalent even if they are so on the low levels. It is observed that we do have uniqueness in case the object theory and the meta theory are provably the same.
Section 5 then proceeds to prove soundness for one-Münchhausen provability for a large class of theories and Section 6 proves arithmetical completeness. In Section 7 it is sketched how one-Münchhausen provability can be formalised in second order arithmetic. The formalisation requires a substantial amount of transfinte induction both in the object and meta theory so that applications to ordinal analysis will become difficult. Finally, in Section 8 some first steps are taken on how to weaken the needed strength of the object and meta theory. By allowing for multiple oracles sentences instead of just one, soundness can be proven without any transfinite induction.
Preliminaries
In this section we dwell succinctly on the necessary notions from both formal arithmetic and modal provability logics. Apart from proving a few new observations, we mainly settle on notation and refer to the literature for details.
Arithmetic
This paper deals with interpretations of transfinite provability logic. Even though the set-up of such interpretations starts schematically so that our analysis applies to a wide range of theories, we will in particular have second order arithmetic in mind. We refer the reader to standard references for details ([30, 19, 5] ) and only include some minimal comments for expository purposes.
For first-order arithmetic, we shall work with theories with identity in the language {0, 1, exp, +, ·, <} of arithmetic where exp denotes the unary function x → 2
x . We define ∆ If P is a predicate, the classes relativized to P are defined the same with the sole difference that we consider the predicate P as an atomic formula. We flag relativisation by including the predicate in brackets after the class like, for example, in Π 0 1 (P ). Peano Arithmetic (PA) contains the basic axioms describing the non-logical symbols together with induction formulas I ϕ for any formula ϕ where as always
. When Γ is a complexity class, by IΓ we denote the theory which is like PA except that induction is restricted to formulas in Γ. The theory I∆ 0 0 is also referred to as elementary arithmetic 1 or Kalmar elementary arithmetic (EA).
In this paper we also mention collection axioms B ϕ which basically state that the range of a function with finite domain is finite: B ϕ := ∀z<y ∃xϕ(z, x) → ∃u ∀z<y ∃ x<uϕ(z, x). Again, for a formula class Γ, by BΓ we denote the set of collection axioms for formulas from Γ.
Second order arithmetic is an extension of first order arithmetic where we now add second order set variables together with a binary symbol ∈ for membership. Instead of extending identity to second order terms we stipulate that second order identity is governed by extensionality: X = Y :⇔ ∀x (x ∈ X ↔ x ∈ Y ). The formula classes Σ 1 n and Π 1 n are defined as their first-order counterpart only that we now count second order quantification alternations. Likewise, by Π 1 ω we denote the class of all second order formulas. The strength of various fragments of second order arithmetics is in large determined by their set existence axioms. The collection axiom for ϕ tells us that ϕ defines a set: ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ). The second order system ACA 0 contains the defining axioms for the first-order non-logical symbols together with set-induction 0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x∈X → x+1∈X) → ∀x x∈X and collection for all arithmetical formulas.
The theory ACA 0 is conservative over PA for first-order formulas. In [17] the system ECA 0 is introduced as ACA 0 except that comprehension is restricted to ∆ 0 0 formulas. In [10, Lemma 3.2] it is proven that ECA 0 is conservative over EA for first-order formulas.
We will tacitly assume that when we are given a theory T , we are actually given a decidable formula τ that binumerates the axioms of T . That is to say, χ is an axiom of T if and only if 2 T ⊢ τ (χ). For each theory T we denote by T the unary Σ 0 1 -predicate that defines provability in T . That is, N |= ϕ if and only if ϕ is provable in T . When we write T ϕ(ẋ) we denote the formula with free variable x that expresses that for each number x, the formula ϕ(n) is provable in T . Here, n denotes the numeral of n which is a syntactical expression denoting 1 In the literature it is more common to work with a formulation of EA in the language without exponentiation. For the purpose of this paper, the differences are not essential. 2 We shall refrain from making a difference between syntactical objects and their Gödel numbers when the context allows us so.
n, for example defined as 0 = 0; x + 1 = x + 1.
The Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington Theorem (FGH for short) states that for any computably enumerable theory U , the corresponding formalised provability predicate is provably Σ 0 1 -complete provided U is consistent. Since the theorem provides an important tool in this paper, let us give a precise formulation.
Theorem 2.1 (Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington). Let U be a computably enumerable theory with corresponding provability predicate U . We have that for
The theorem was given its name in [32] in acknowledgment to the intellectual parents. Generalisations to other arithmetical provability predicates were studied in [24] and [26] . In particular, the quantification over Σ 0 1 formulas (without exponentiation however) can be made internal in EA and the ρ is obtained from σ by means of an elementary function.
Transfinite provability logic
Even though via the FGH theorem the provability predicate T is in a sense Σ 1 complete for a wide variety of theories, the provable structural behaviour of the predicate can be described with well-behaved PSPACE decidable propositional modal logics.
The simplest modal logics have one unary modal operator which syntactically behaves like negation. The dual modality ♦ can be seen as an abbreviation of ¬ ¬. The basic logic K is axiomatised by all propositional tautologies (in the signature with ) and all so-called distribution axioms (A → B) → ( A → B). The rules of K are modus ponens and Necessitation: from A conclude A. The logic K4 arises by adding the transitivity axioms to K: A → A. Gödel Löb's logic GL arises to adding Löb's axiom scheme to K: ( A → A) → A. It is known that GL is a proper extension of K4 and that it exactly describes the provable structural properties of the provability predicate for a wide range of theories.
In this paper we are interested in provability logics of a collection of provability predicates [α] of increasing strength indexed by ordinals α. For the finite ordinals, this logic was discovered by Japaridze in [22] . We now present this logic, which would be GLP ω in our notation as given in the following definition. Definition 2.2. For Λ an ordinal or the class of all ordinals, the logic GLP Λ is given by the following axioms:
1. all propositional tautologies, 2. Distributivity:
The rules are Modes Ponens and Necessitation for each modality:
The following lemma is proven in [7] .
The lemma is particularly useful in proofs where you only have access to reasoning up to GLP ′ Λ and tells you that any statement formulated in this fragment can actually be proven there. We shall use this result throughout the paper, mostly without explicit mention. Let us now prove some basic properties that shall be needed later in the paper.
Lemma 2.4.
Proof. We reason in GLP. For Item 2 we work under the assumption that α ⊤. From β ϕ we get, since β < α, that [α] β ϕ so from α ⊤ we get α β ϕ. For the other direction, from α β ϕ we get by monotonicity that β β ϕ whence by transitivity we obtain the required β ϕ.
For Item 3: We now work under the assumption that α ⊤. The only case to consider in the → direction is when ψ holds. Then, ψ whence [α] ψ which together with α ⊤ yields α ψ whence β (φ ∨ ψ).
For the ← direction we need to prove β (φ∨ ψ) → β φ∨ ψ. So, suppose β (φ ∨ ψ) and ¬ ψ whence [β]¬ ψ. But since β (φ ∨ ψ) we must have β φ and by weakening β φ ∨ ψ.
Transfinite induction and its kin
In various arguments we will have to prove that a statement ϕ holds for all ordinals α. Often we will prove this by transfinite recursion on α. However, in certain cases, transfinite induction is not available. In such cases there is a technique called reflexive induction.
The principle of reflexive induction can syntactically be seen as twice weakening regular transfinite induction. Recall that transfinite induction for a formula ϕ is
and for a set of formulas Γ the principle TI(Γ) denotes the collection of all TI ϕ for ϕ ∈ Γ. As a first weakening one could consider the rule based version: from
) to arrive at reflexive induction. However, it turns out that by doing so, it has lost all its strength. That, is, the resulting principle is provable in almost any theory:
Theorem 2.5 (Reflexive induction). Let T be any theory capable of coding
Although this principle is well known since Schmerl's work ( [28] ) we include a proof to emphasize that the principle actually does not rely at all on the fact that < is a well-order. As a matter of fact, the proof goes through for any kind of relation and basically boils down to an application of Löb's Theorem.
Proof. We shall see that from the assumption
we get T ⊢ T ∀αϕ(α) → ∀αϕ(α) so that the conclusion T ⊢ ∀αϕ(α) follows by Löb's Theorem.
Thus, we reason in T , pick α arbitrary, we assume T ∀αϕ(α), or equivalently T ∀θϕ(θ), and set out to prove ϕ(α). But using T (∀ β<α ϕ(β)) → ϕ(α) in the last step of the following reasoning, we clearly have
On occasion, in this paper we will have to combine regular transfinite induction and reflexive induction. We call this amalgamate transfinite reflexive induction.
Lemma 2.6 (Transfinite reflexive induction). Let T be a theory with a sufficient amount of transfinite induction as specified below and let ≺ be a well-order in T .
If
To prove transfinite reflexive induction for ϕ it suffices that T is capable of coding syntax and proves transfinite induction for formulas of the form T χ → ϕ.
Proof. To start our proof we assume
We will prove by transfinite induction on α that
so that the result T ⊢ ∀α ϕ(α) follows by reflexive induction (Lemma 2.5). Proving (2) for α = 0 amounts to showing that T ⊢ ϕ(0) which follows directly from (1) .
For the inductive step, we reason in T , fix some α > 0, assume that
and set out to prove
To this end, we further assume that T ∀ γ≺α ϕ(γ), so that certainly we have ∀ β≺α T ∀ γ≺β ϕ(γ). Combining the latter with (3) yields ∀ β≺α ϕ(β). This, together with our assumption T ∀ γ≺α ϕ(γ) is the antecedent of (1) so that we may conclude ϕ(α) which finishes the proof.
Theories for Single Oracle Münchhausen provability
Throughout this section, we fix some ordinal Λ and understand that all ordinals denoted in this section are majorized by Λ.
Single Oracle Münchhausen provability
We are interested in theories T that can formalize a provability notion so that provably in T the following recursion holds
Here, T ϕ will denote a standard predicate on the natural numbers expressing "the formula (with Gödel number) ϕ is provable in the theory T ". Further, it is understood that ξ
Rather than exposing a concrete theory where this recursion is formalizable in a particular way and provable, we will define a class of theories that are able to define and prove this recursion and have some additional desirable properties.
Next we shall see which properties of the predicates [ζ]
Λ T can be proven from the mere recursion defined in (5). It will turn out that under some fairly general conditions we can prove the collection of predicates [ζ] Λ T for ζ < Λ to provide a sound interpretation for GLP Λ .
In Section 6 we shall see that by requiring slightly more on our predicate and theory, this will give us arithmetical completeness.
In principle it would make sense to study (5) at a higher level of generality. For example, T could be some version of set-theory allowing for uncountable Λ. As long as (5) is provable together withs some additional conditions, most of the results of this paper will carry over. It would be natural to require T to be such that all GL theorems are schematically provable in T in such a setting.
Theories amenable for Single Oracle Münchhausen provability
For the sake of readability we shall often not distinguish between an ordinal α < Γ, a notation for such an α or even an arithmetization of such a notation for α. We shall however be explicit about the difference between the ordering < on the ordinals and the arithmetization ≺ of this ordering on ordinals.
Definition 3.1. Let T be a theory and let Λ denote an ordinal equipped with a representation in the language of T with corresponding represented ordering ≺.
For this representation, it is required that
T ⊢ "≺ is transitive, right-discrete and has a minimal element",
We call T a Single Oracle Λ-Münchhausen Theory -or a Λ-One-Münchhausen Theory for short-whenever there is a binary predicate [ξ] Λ T ϕ with free variables ξ and ϕ so that
In this case, we call the binary predicate Observation 3.2. Since any 1-Münchhausen theory T proves that there is a ≺-minimal element, we shall use the notation 0 for this element even if the natural number (or object) representing this minimal element is not the natural number zero. Likewise, from right-discreteness we know that for any element α ≺ Λ, there is a next bigger element that we shall suggestively call α + 1. In analogy, we shall denote 0 + 1 by 1, 1 + 1 by 2, 2 + 1 by 3, etcetera.
The following observation is immediate. 
Proof. By a simple case distinction. In case ξ = 0, we get from a hypothetical N |= [0] T ⊥ together with the soundness and the above lemma that N |= T ⊥ so that T ⊢ ⊥ which cannot be.
In case ξ ≻ 0, suppose for a contradiction that N |= [ξ] T ⊥. Then, using soundness of T , we only need to consider the case that
so that for some ordinal ζ ≺ ξ and some formula ψ we have N |= ζ T ψ. Also N |= T ( ζ T ψ → ⊥) so that T ⊢ ζ T ψ → ⊥ whence by soundness of T we see that N |= ¬ ζ T ψ which is a contradiction.
We note that the above argument does not use transfinite induction.
On uniqueness of Münchhausen provability
The definition of 1-Münchhausen provability allows for various different 1-Münchhausen predicates to exist. Of course, it would be highly desirable that the defining equivalence (5) for 1-Münchhausen provability defined a T provably unique predicate. We can prove uniqueness of the predicate via an external induction up to any level below ω. 
Proof. We proceed by an external induction where the base case follow directly from Lemma 3.3. We shall omit super and sub indices.
For the inductive step, we reason in T , fix some formula ϕ, fix the (n + 1)th element in the ≺ ordering and assume [n + 1]ϕ. In the non-trivial case, there is some formula ψ and an elementm≺n + 1 so that m ψ and ( m ψ → ϕ). Here we end our reasoning inside T . Since we can prove that any element ≺-below the externally given n + 1 is either the zero-th, or the first, or . . . or, the n-th element, we know thatm corresponds to some natural number m < n+1. Thus, we can appeal to the external induction hypothesis that tells us that
and consequently
These two ingredients are sufficient to conclude [m]ψ. Of course the other direction goes exactly the same.
Let us make some observations about this simple proof. First, we observe that we could only conclude (7) from (6) by necessitation since the meta-theory as in T ⊢ . . . is the same as the object-theory as in T . Second, we observe that we only had access to the inductive hypothesis since we can express in the language of first order logic that being smaller than the (n+1)th element implies being equal to one of the zero-th, or . . . , or the nth element. Of course, we cannot generalize this to the first limit ordinal and hence our external induction cannot be extended to the transfinite.
If we wish to generalize our argument to the transfinite, we should replace our external induction by an internal one. Of course, then in our meta-theory, we should have access to transfinite induction. However, we only see how to continue the proof in the case where the object theory equals the meta-theory and consequently also has the same amount of transfinite induciton. Lemma 4.2. Let T be a theory that proves the recursion from (5) for two predicates [ζ] U and [ζ] U . We further suppose that T proves the basic facts about the ordering Λ, ≺ . Also, we assume that T proves transfinite
If T and U are T -provably equivalent, then we have that [ζ] U and [ζ] U are T -provably equivalent predicates.
Proof. We have chosen a formulation where T and U are different from the outset so that we clearly see at what point we need to assume that T is Tprovably equivalent to U .
Thus, we reason in T and will as a first attempt prove by transfinite
For ζ = 0 the equivalence is obvious. Thus, we fix some ζ ≻ 0 and focus on one implication the other being analogous. Thus, we assume that [ζ] U ϕ and set out to prove [ζ] U ϕ.
From the assumption [ζ] U ϕ we find -in the non-trivial case-some formula ψ and ordinal ξ ≺ ζ so that ξ U ψ and U ( ξ U ψ → ϕ). The inductive hypothesis now will tell us that ξ U ψ ↔ ξ U ψ.
However, there is no way that we know that this equivalence is provable, that is, that we have U ξ U ψ ↔ ξ U ψ . The latter would be needed to conclude
The problem cannot be solved by strengthening the induction to for example
since then the problem will simply come back but now under a box. However, when T = U we have access to transfinite reflexive induction as formulated in Lemma 2.6. That is, in order to show that ∀ϕ
) which makes that the proof now goes through easily.
This lemma tells us that solutions to the recursion equivalence (5) need not be provably unique if the object theory U is different from the meta theory T or in case we do not have the sufficient amount of transfinite induction available. Not having provably unique fixpoints need not necessarily be a big problem and similar phenomena occur with for example Rosser fixpoints.
However, as we shall see in Section 5, we also need the object theory to be equal to the meta theory if we wish to prove the soundness of GLP Λ with respect to the [ζ] Λ U predicates. In particular, the arithmetical soundness of the Necessitation rule requires the object and meta theory to be equal.
In case the object theory is not equal to the meta-theory, we can only prove a weak form of uniqueness as expressed in the following lemma. 
Proof. We reason in T and proceed by a transfinite induction on α. Thus, we assume the equi-consistency of both theories, fix some formula ϕ and assume [α]ϕ. The case where [α]⊥ is trivial, so we assume α ⊤ whence also α ⊤. Thus, in case ¬[α]ϕ we may by consistency use ψ = ⊥.
In case that [α]ϕ in virtue of U ϕ, we are done by the FGH theorem (Theorem 2.1) for the theory V since U ϕ ∈ Σ 0 1 . In the other case, there are β ≺ α and χ so that β χ and U ( β χ → ϕ). By the IH we find some χ ′ so that β χ ′ ↔ β χ. Since we work under the assumption of α ⊤ and since the provability predicates are sound for GLP Λ we also have α β χ ′ by Lemma 2.4.2 and, in particular ♦ V β χ ′ . Since we now know the consistency of the theory V + β χ ′ we may apply the FGH theorem to obtain a ψ with
By the formalised deduction theorem we may conclude
In this section we have shown that in general we cannot prove that 1-Münchhausen provability predicates are uniquely defined by the recursion in (5) . Only in the finite ordinals can we prove uniqueness. This allows us to relate the provability notions from this paper to similar ones from the literature. The most prominent example is given by the predicate
[n]
True T ϕ which stands for ∃ π∈Π
Furthermore, in [24] a reading is given where the modal operators [n]ϕ are interpreted as follows.
[0] T φ := T φ, and
Soundness for this interpretation in PA was proven and a strong relation was given to the truth provability predicates [n] True T . The next Lemma is a strengthening on the one hand since we weaken the base theory to EA and a weakening on the other hand since we only consider two modalities. Lemma 4.4. Let T be a theory that contains EA. We have that The second item follows from the first since the statement holds for the [n]
True T provability predicates (see e.g. [5] ). The third item is implicit in [24] and explicitly stated and proven in [26] for the [1] True T predicate which suffices by the first item of this lemma.
Via an easy external induction we can prove that (8) and (5) define provably equivalent predices for all natural numbers. That is to say, if T is a 1-Münchhausen theory, then for each natural number n we have that 
GLP 2 is sound for T when interpreting
Proof. This follows directly from (9) and Lemma 4.4.
Arithmetical Soundness for One-Münchhausen provability
In this section we will consider Λ-One-Münchhausen theories T and their corresponding Λ-One-Münchhausen provability predicates for some fixed ordinal Λ represented in T . We shall see that from the mere defining recursion on the provability predicate we can obtain soundness of GLP Λ . Many arguments in this section require transfinite induction. As we have observed in Subsection ?? this means that the base theory should also prove a decent amount of transfinite induction. In Section 8 we shall see how the need of transfinite induction can be circumvented by slightly altering the defining recursion.
Let us start the soundness proof by some basic observations that need very little arithmetical strength to be proven. In particular, the following facts do not require transfinite induction. 
Proof. Clearly, the first item follows from the second, so we reason in T and assume [ξ] T ϕ. Thus, in the non-trivial case, for some ψ and for some ζ ≺ ξ we have ζ T ψ and T ( ζ T ψ → ϕ). Clearly, since T (ϕ → χ), we have also
The third item follows from the second since in case of T ψ we also have
The fourth item follows by an easy case distinction on ξ being zero or not and both cases essentially follow from the fact that provably ∃x T ϕ(ẋ) → T ∃xϕ(x).
From our defining recursion (5), we get the axiom of negative introspection and the axiom of monotonicity almost for free.
Lemma 5.2. Let ξ < ζ < Λ be ordinals in a Λ-One-Münchhausen theory T . We have
Proof. Item 1 is immediate since T ( ξ T ϕ → ξ T ϕ) using the fact that ξ < ζ implies T ⊢ ξ ≺ ζ. Likewise, Item 2 follows directly from the definition since provably η ≺ ξ → η ≺ ζ (recall that we required that Münchhausen theories prove the transitivity of ≺ and moreover, ξ < ζ implies T ⊢ ξ ≺ ζ).
It is easy yet important to observe that we actually have a formalized version of the previous lemma where we internally quantify over the ordinals. As such, the formalized lemma can be used for example in an induction where possibly non-standard ordinals are called upon.
Lemma 5.3. Let T be a Λ-One-Münchhausen theory. We have
These cross axioms are for many interpretations of GLP Λ actually the harder axioms to prove sound. But in the Münchhausen interpretations they come almost for free.
The above lemma can also be interpreted that any 1-Münchhausen provability predicate is monotone in the ordinal parameter. We note that it is not trivial to see that the 1-Münchhausen provability predicate is monotone in the underlying base theory: Suppose that, for example we have a formulation of elementary arithmetic and axiomatic set theory so that provably EA ⊂ ZFC. This means that for any formula ϕ we have EA ϕ → ZFC ϕ. Is it now easy to see that we also have the expected [ 
Let us suppose that [1] EA ϕ because of some 0 EA ψ with EA ( 0 EA ψ → ϕ). A priori it is not at all clear how this information will yield us a ψ ′ so that completeness we get T ⊢ T ϕ.
We shall now prove the remaining GLP axioms to be sound. The following lemma which was proven in [17] , tells us that we don't need to care about Löb's
Lemma 5.5. Let GL denote the extension of GL with a new operator and the following axioms for all formulas φ, and ψ:
Then, for all φ, 
3. Closure under conjunctions:
Proof. If we wish to prove Item 1, we should prove the soundness of the rules and of the axioms.
As to the rules, the only rules of GLP are modus ponens and a necessitation rule for each modality:
. As pointed out in Lemma 5.4 the soundness of the necessitation rules follows from necessitation for T and by monotonicity, Lemma 5.3. As always, the soundness of modus ponens is immediate.
In the remainder of our proof we shall thus focus on the axioms. Since we proved the correctness of the negative introspection axioms -axioms of the form β ϕ → [α] β ϕ for β < α-and of the monotonicity axioms -axioms of the form [β]ϕ → [α]ϕ for β < α-without any induction in Lemma 5.3 and since by Lemma 5.5 we may disregard Löb's axiom, we set out to prove the remaining axioms which are just the distribution and the transitivity axioms to complete a proof of Item 1. In other words, to complete the proof of Item 1 we should prove Items 2 and 5.
To prove that both items hold up to a certain level α < Λ we proceed by an internal transfinite reflexive induction on α as expressed in Lemma 2.6. We need to prove both items simultaneously since they depend on each other. As a matter of fact, to get the proof going we will need to do some induction building and prove Items 2 -5 of the proof simultaneously by a transfinite reflexive induction on α.
Thus, we will reason in T and shall mostly omit the subscript T and superscript Λ in the remainder of this proof. The base case of the theorem is known to hold via the soundness of GL and the FGH theorem.
For the reflexive inductive step, we are to prove our four items (Items 2 -5) at level α assuming that we have access to all four items at any level β ≺ α and we also have these four items under a regular provability predicate T at any level β ′ ≺ α. As we observed before, Item 1 at level α (soundness of GLP α ) follows directly from Items 2 -5 for levels β ≺ α. Thus, we may in our inductive step assume that we have access -and T -provably so-to all GLP α reasoning. Let us thus focus on the first item to prove:
. We fix some ϕ and ψ and assume [α]ϕ and [α]ψ. We consider two cases. In the easy case, we have that at least one of ϕ or ψ holds in which case the result directly follows from Lemma 5.1.3.
In the remaining case, by the recursion equation for [α], we find ordinals β, β ′ < α and some formulas ϕ
. We first remark that w.l.o.g. we may assume β ′ = β. For, if e.g. β ′ < β, then by Lemma 2.4.2 we see that
Since we perform a transfinite reflexive induction, we also have our inductive hypotheses under a and in particular (
So, we assume β ′ = β < α, and by the inductive hypothesis (on Item 4), we find χ with β χ ↔ β ϕ ′ ∧ β ψ ′ whence by the reflexive induction hypothesis also ( β χ ↔ β ϕ ′ ∧ β ψ ′ ). Consequently, we have that ( β χ → ϕ ∧ ψ) and we are done with the direction [α]ϕ∧[α]ψ → [α](ϕ∧ψ). The other direction follows directly from Lemma 5.1 since ((ϕ ∧ ψ) → ϕ) and ((ϕ ∧ ψ) → ψ).
. From the previous item we know that
so that the result follows from Lemma 5.1.
We still reason in T and assume that for some arbitrary ϕ and ψ we have That is, we consider the case that α ⊤. We claim that under this assumption, e.g. [α]ϕ is equivalent to the single ∃ β≺α ∃ϕ
so we only need to see that the first disjunct ϕ implies the second. But since we work under the assumption that α ⊤, in particular, we have β ⊤ for any ordinal β ≺ α. Moreover, for any such β we have that ϕ → ( β ⊤ → ϕ) so that the claim follows. Using this observation, we find by unfolding the definition of 1-Münchhausen provability in [α]ϕ ∨ [α]ψ some formulas ϕ ′ and ψ ′ and some ordinals β, β
Since we work under the assumption that α ⊤ holds with α ≥ 2, we certainly have max {β, β ′ , 1} ⊤ so that as before we may and will assume without loss of generality that β ′ = β and β ≥ 1. Using the distributivity laws we see that (10) is equivalent to
and,
By the reflexive induction hypotheses and by Lemma 2.4.3 -by the inductive hypothesis and Lemma 2.3 we may use any GLP β reasoning-we see that (11) can be written as a single diamond formula, say β χ ′ . Thus, we would be done if we can find some formula χ so that
We will find such a χ by applying the FGH theorem with base theory T + β χ ′ . It thus remains to see that this theory T + β χ ′ is consistent. From β χ ′ we get by negative introspection (Lemma 5.3.1) that [α] β χ ′ . Recall that we work under the assumption that α ⊤ so that by distributivity at level α -which is already known at this stage in our proof-we get
whence by monotonicity we get ♦ β χ ′ whence ♦ T + β χ ′ ⊤. The existence of some χ so that (13) holds is now guaranteed by the (formalized) FGH theorem applied to the theory T + β χ ′ since
While reasoning in T we assume [α]ϕ and only consider the non-trivial case. Thus, for some ϕ ′ and some β ≺ α we get β ϕ ′ and ( β ϕ ′ → ϕ). By negative introspection we get [α] β ϕ ′ . Since T is a 1-Münchhausen theory it proves some properties of the order ≺. In particular, from β ≺ α, we also get [α](β ≺ α). From ( β ϕ ′ → ϕ) we obtain by applying successively provable Σ 
Completeness of Münchhausen provability
In this section we shall prove that under some modest set of extra assumptions, we can obtain completeness of one-Münchhausen provability. Basically, this section consist of invoking a result from [17] and recasting it in our context. Let us first recall some definitions and results.
Uniform proof and provability predicates
The definitions and results from this subsection all come from [17] where an arithmetical completeness proof is given that is schematic in an abstract kind of provability predicates. A first step in defining these provability predicates consists of defining so-called Λ-uniform proof and provability predicates over T .
A Λ-uniform proof predicate over T is a formula π(c, λ, φ) (with all free variables shown) satisfying
We say that π is sound 5 if, moreover, N |= ∀λ∀φ ([λ] π φ → φ). A formulaπ is a Λ-uniform provability predicate over T if T ⊢π ↔ ∃c π, where π is a Λ-uniform proof predicate.
Moreover, the provability predicates are required to require a modicum of good behaviour as captured in the following definition. Definition 6.2. Let π be a Λ-uniform proof predicate over a theory T . We say that π is normalized if it is provable in T that for every λ we have that every λ-derivable formula has infinitely many λ-derivations and, whenever [c : λ] π φ and [c : λ] π ψ, it follows that φ = ψ; in other words, every derivation must be a derivation of a single formula.
Modal formulas are linked to arithmetical ones via an arithmetic interpretation. The following uniform completeness theorem is proven in [17, Theorem 10.2] and provides us with an easy way to prove completeness for our current interpretation.
Theorem 6.4. If Λ is a computable linear order, T is any sound, representable theory extending RCA 0 , π is a sound, normalized, Λ-uniform proof predicate over T and φ is any L -formula, GLP Λ ⊢ φ if and only if, for every arithmetic interpretation f , T ⊢ f π (φ).
Arithmetical completeness for Münchhausen provability
We can now combine the results from this paper and the previous subsection to see that under some extra conditions we obtain arithmetical completeness for one-Münchhausen provability.
Theorem 6.5 (Arithmetical Completeness). Let Λ be a computable linear order, T is any sound, representable one-Münchhausen theory extending RCA 0 with corresponding provability predicate
T Λ ϕ is a uniform provability predicate and in particular,
Proof. As always, the * in the statement of the theorem is understood to range over arithmetical interpretations that map propositional variables to arbitrary sentences, so that * commutes with the boolean connectives and each modal formula [α]ψ is mapped to [α] T Λ ψ * . From our provability predicate (omitting sub and superscripts) [α]ϕ we will define a proof predicate π(c, λ, φ) for which we will observe that over T it is a normalized uniform proof predicate so that provably ∃c π(c, λ, φ) ↔ [λ]φ. To this end we define
It is straightforward to see that, indeed, T ⊢ ∃c π(c, λ, φ) ↔ [λ]φ. Since Proof T is a normalized proof predicate, so is π. Thus, we should only check Properties 1 -7 from Definition 6.1. Property 1 is one of the assumptions of the theorem and Properties 2, 3 and 7 follow directly from the arithmetical soundness of one-Münchhausen provability. Property 4 follows since T is a one-Münchhausen theory whence proves transitivity of ≺. Properties 5 and 6 are a direct consequence of the definition of π and the soundness of the oneMünchhausen provability predicate.
Some notes on the Formalisation of one-Münchhausen provability
Throughout this paper we have been talking about Münchhausen provability predicates and proving all sorts of properties of them. The reserved reader may now question whether there exist one-Münchhausen theories with corresponding one-Münchhausen provability predicates at all. In this section we sketch how to formalize a Münchhausen provability predicate in second order arithmetic. Just as in [17] we start our formalization by reserving a set parameter X where we will collect all the pairs α, ϕ of ordinals α and formulas ϕ so that [α]ϕ holds. Next, we will write down a predicate that all and only the correct pairs α, ϕ are in X. Thus, we write the recursion for one-Münchhausen provability replacing every occurrence of [α]ϕ by α, ϕ ∈ X and consequently replacing α ϕ by α, ¬ϕ / ∈ X. We define any set satisfying our predicate to be an 1−IMC for Iterated one-Münchhausen Class.
By naively doing so, a problem arises namely that we get occurrences of the set variable X under the regular provability predicate T . By using numerals we can speak under a box about numbers that 'live outside the box'. However, we do not have any syntactical artefact to denote arbitrary sets. A possibly way out here would be to resort to oracle-provability as introduced in [10] . Thus, for one-Münchhausen provability, the predicate would look something like:
With such a predicate we can then define:
However, it is not clear if such a predicate will satisfy the required recursive equation since the relation between oracle provability and regular provability is not yet entirely understood in all its details. For these and other reasons we choose a different approach. We will anticipate that hopefully/probably the 1−IMC predicate will define a unique set. Then, under the box we can just use any set that satisfies IMC(X). Of course, the fixpoint theorem allows us to do so. In the formalisation of Münchhausen provability we will closely follow [17] . As such we allow ourselves to be rather sketchy and refer to [17] for the details.
Definition 7.1. We define the predicate 1−IMC(X, γ) using the fixpoint theorem so that it satisfies (provably in ECA 0 ) the following recursion.
With this Iterated one-Münchhausen Class predicate we define our one-Münchhausen predicate as
It is clear that our definition supposes that we fix an ordinal notation system for some ordinal Λ and that all our ordinal quantifications are restricted to this Λ. We observe that
Consequently we can rewrite the defining recursion for Iterated one-Münchhausen Classes as
It is clear that 1−IMC depends on the base theory U and on the ordinal representation Λ but for the sake of readability we suppress these dependencies in our notation. We remark that 1−IMC(X, γ) is of complexity Π 0 2 with free set variable X. Our predicate [α]ϕ has a universal quantifier ranging over all sets that are iterated Münchhausen classes. Of course, we would hope that indeed such classes are uniquely defined if they exists at all.
In order to express this, we will fix the following notation
and
We can now state and prove a key ingredient in proving that our formalisation satisfies the defining recursion for Münchhausen provability.
Lemma 7.2. Let U be a theory extending ECA 0 . We have that
Proof. We prove by transfinite induction that IMC(X, α)∧IMC(Y, α) → X ≡ α Y where X and Y are unbounded set variables. Note that this is an arithmetical formula so that ACA 0 can prove transfinite induction up to α for this formula since we assumed wo(α).
Now that we have uniqueness we proceed as in [17, Theorem 4.3] to observe that we actually may perform transfinite induction for second order formulas as long as the second order formulas are restricted to the IMCs.
We are now ready to prove that our formalisation satisfies the required recursion.
Theorem 7.4. Let T be any presentable theory extending ECA 0 . We have
Proof. By transfinite induction on α as in [17] . Note that we need the existence of a 1−IMC for the → direction. By Theorem 7.3 we have access to the transfinite induction in ACA 0 since we proved uniqueness for 1−IMC's.
Weakening the base theory: Münchhausen provability
In this paper we have introduced the notion of one-Münchhausen provability for which we have proven arithmetical sound and completeness. Furthermore, we have shown in Theorem 7.4 that the notion can be formalised in second order arithmetic. However, the theory where the formalisation takes place is quite strong. In particular, it requires a fair amount of transfinite induction. As pointed out, this prove theoretic strength is consequently also required in the object theory which is not desirable. Via various tricks, one can lower the required proof theoretic strength of the object and meta-theory. A first step in doing so is via the introduction of Münchhausen provability. Further tricks are presented and worked out in [26] .
To define Münchhausen provability we will start out with a very similar but slightly different recursion equivalence:
In this recursive equivalence we understand that σ is a finite sequence of formulas with |σ| denoting the length of the sequence and σ(i) denoting the ith element of the sequence. Likewise, τ is understood as being a sequence of ordinals all bounded by α. We will write either τ (i) or τ i for the ith element of τ . Moreover, α ⊠ is as always to be read a shorthand for ¬[α] ⊠ ¬. One of the main complications in proving the arithmetical soundness of one-Münchhausen provability in the previous section was in the proof of the closure of provability under conjunctions that is,
The proof of this required a weak closure of consistency under conjunctions -∀ϕ, ψ ∃χ α ϕ ∧ α ψ ↔ α χ -so that the conjunction of two oracle sentences could be conceived as a single oracle sentence. However, in the new recursive equivalence as we just defined in (14) , the closure of oracles under conjunctions is built into the definition.
A further complication in proving the arithmetical soundness of one-Münch-hausen provability in the previous sections was caused by the fact that weak closure under conjunctions of consistency needed to be verified under a box. This was obtained by requiring a fair amount of transfinite induction and by requiring that the object and meta-theory be equal. In this last section we shall see that these requirements can also be circumvented.
The defining equation (14) begs for a notational simplification. From now on, the greek letter σ shall be reserved to denote sequences of formulas and the greek letter τ shall be reserved to denote sequences of ordinals. As such, we settle upon the notational convention that τ ≺ α is short for ∀ i<|τ | τ i ≺α and τ ⊠ T σ is short for |σ|= |τ | ∧ ∀ i<|σ| τ i ⊠ T σ(i). Since we shall require that provably |σ|= |τ |→ T |σ|= |τ |, the defining recursion can be recasted as
Although we still cannot prove that different predicates that provably satisfy (15) are provably equivalent, at least proving soundness of GLP Λ for such predicates becomes an easy matter. Let us first define some important notions as before but now for Münchhausen provability instead of one-Münchhausen provability. Moreover, it is understood that T has a simple coding machinery for finite sequence of objects so that the obvious facts about length and concatenation provably hold. For example, T ⊢ |τ |= n → T |τ |= n, etc.
In this case we call [α]
⊠ T Λ a T (Λ)-Münchhausen provability predicate.
When the theory T and ordinal Λ are clear from the context, we shall simply speak of a Münchhausen theory and of a Münchhausen provability predicate. On occasion we might only mention the ordinal Λ or only the theory T and speak of, for example, a Λ-Münchhausen theory and a T -Münchhausen provability predicate respectively. As with one-Münchhausen provability we see that the interaction axioms become trivial to prove for any Münchhausen provability predicate. In what follows we will revisit and simplify the soundness proof. So, in the remaining and only non-trivial case, we find two pairs of sequences σ ϕ with τ ϕ and σ ϕ→ψ with τ ϕ→ψ so that τ ϕ ≺ α ∧ τ ϕ σ ϕ ∧ ( τ ϕ σ ϕ → ϕ) and also τ ϕ→ψ ≺ α∧ τ ϕ→ψ σ ϕ→ψ ∧ τ ϕ→ψ σ ϕ→ψ → (ϕ → ψ) . We now consider the concatenation τ ϕ ⋆ τ ϕ→ψ of both τ -sequences and likewise σ ϕ ⋆ σ ϕ→ψ denotes the concatenation of both σ-sequences. Clearly, we have |τ ϕ ⋆τ ϕ→ψ |= |σ ϕ ⋆σ ϕ→ψ | and τ ϕ ⋆ τ ϕ→ψ ≺ α. Likewise, from our assumptions it is easy to observe that τ ϕ ⋆ τ ϕ→ψ σ ϕ ⋆ σ ϕ→ψ and τ ϕ ⋆ τ ϕ→ψ σ ϕ ⋆ σ ϕ→ψ → ψ so that indeed
[α] ⊠ ψ.
As a consequence of our previous lemmas, we know that all reasoning of the modal logic K can be applied to any Münchhausen provability predicate. We now turn to the transitivity axiom to conclude that each predicate [α] ⊠ actually is sound for K4. Before proving this, we need one easy technical observation. ⊠ . We have that
Proof. We reason in T and assume that for some x we gave [α] ⊠ ϕ(ẋ). Thus, for some (possibly empty) σ and some ordinal β (less than α in case σ is nonempty) we have α ⊠ σ and ( β ⊠ σ → ϕ(ẋ)) whence also ( β ⊠ σ → ∃xϕ(x)) as was to be shown.
We can now prove the soundness of the transitivity axiom. ⊠ . We have that
Proof. The proof is very similar to Item 5 of Theorem 5.6 but now, there is no need for induction since we already know our predicate to be sound for K reasoning. Thus, we reason in T , fix some ordinal α ≺ Λ and formula ϕ and assume [α] ⊠ ϕ. Now either ϕ or there is some sequence of ordinals τ ≺ α and sequence σ so that β ⊠ σ and β ⊠ σ → ϕ . In the first case, we get from ϕ that ϕ whence by applying monotonicity twice that [α] ⊠ [α] ⊠ ϕ. Thus we focus on the second case and fix a particular sequences τ and σ so that 1. τ ≺ α;
2. τ ⊠ σ;
3. τ ⊠ σ → ϕ .
From the first item, we get by assumptions on Münchhausen theories that [α] ⊠ (τ ≺ α). From the second item we get by negative introspection that
From the third item we get
ϕ . Collecting these three consequences and applying provable closure of provability under conjunctions we obtain
so that by Lemma 8.5 we conclude It is clear how the completeness proof and formalisation can be adapted to the new provability notion. Actually, it seems that in a sense Münchhausen provability is more fundamental than one-Münchhausen provability. We have chosen to start this paper with one-Münchhausen provability instead for two reasons. Firstly, the defining recursion for one-Münchhausen provability is slightly easier and more perspicuous. But secondly, it is important to be aware of the tension between provable properties and provable provable properties in the notion of one-Münchhausen provability and how this tension can be mitigated via transfinite reflexive induction.
